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In this paper we empirically discuss the question whether or not debt relief in the past 
fifteen years has been economically rational. Analysing the determinants of debt relief 
our results suggest that governance quality did not play a role in the decision of 
creditor countries to forgive debt in the 1990s. Furthermore, even the actual debt 
burden of highly indebted poor countries had not been crucial for the decision whether 
or not debt forgiveness was granted. Rather, debt relief followed a strong path 
dependence: those countries whose debt had been forgiven in the first half of the 1990s 
have also been granted debt forgiveness in the second half of this decade. However, 
this allocation pattern changed at the beginning of the 21st century, where the path 
dependence was less strong and at least some dimensions of governance quality have 
been taken into account by donor countries.   
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Debt Relief and Changing Governance Structures in 
Developing Countries 
1  INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, developing countries have received a huge amount of debt 
relief. In the first place, the objective of debt relief programs is to reduce the external 
debt of severely indebted poor countries to a ‘sustainable’ level. The alleviation of the 
debt burden for developing countries is supposed to improve the resource position of 
these countries and to enhance investments and further economic growth and devel-
opment. There have been high expectations that debt reduction initiatives, especially 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative (HIPC II), launched by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996 and 1999 
respectively, will free resources in HIPCs for spending for the sake of the poor.  
In this paper we analyze the political and economic determinants of debt relief for 
highly indebted poor countries. This is a relevant topic not only because debt relief 
implies that scarce public funds in creditor countries are used, which should always be 
done carefully and after sound cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, bailing out broke 
countries that became highly indebted mainly because of inappropriate and irrespon-
sible policies could create negative incentives and cause serious problems of moral 
hazard. 
For this purpose we first ask whether or not debt relief can be expected to be effective 
in order to stimulate economic growth as well as – since good governance and decent 
institutions have been proved to be of special importance for economic growth and 
development – to improve governance structures in these countries. After answering 
this question, we concentrate on the central topic of this paper, namely the question of 
whether debt relief has been provided in favor of countries that have shown decent 
governance structures or at least improvements of their institutional settings. There is a 
rich literature dealing with the determinants of debt relief. The contribution of this 
paper is to analyze the change in these determinants due to new public insights into 
the nature of governance structure.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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We distinguish three sub periods of the time span between 1990 and 2004 to see 
whether or not governments of creditor countries have taken into account the govern-
ance structures and institutional quality of debtor countries. We are also interested in 
the question whether or not donor behavior changed after the low impact of debt relief 
programs on economic performance and governance structures in the 1990s had 
become obvious.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we give an 
overview about debt relief programs that have been initialized since the 1980s. After 
that we present the literature covering three important issues related to debt relief, 
namely the rationale, the effectiveness as well as the determinants of debt relief. In 
section 4, we briefly introduce our theoretical hypotheses, which we want to test 
empirically. Section 5 is dedicated to an overview about the data and the presentation 
of the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes our findings. 
2  DEBT RELIEF PROGRAMS IN RECENT HISTORY  
Although the world had seen earlier concerns about the debt situation in developing 
countries resulting in some debt relief initiatives like the Pearson Report in 1969 and 
the Retroactive Terms Adjustment (RTA) program in 1978, the debt problem became 
apparent in 1982 with Mexico defaulting on its debt payments. This event marks the 
beginning of the debt crisis of developing countries. In the subsequent years, various 
debt relief and restructuring programs had been introduced, mainly to prevent further 
defaults of debtors through the provision of new loans and debt rescheduling. Most of 
the debt restructuring programs of the 1980s, such as the Baker Plan and the Brady 
Plan, bailed out private sector creditors and allowed commercial banks to write off 
some of the active debts by rescheduling them, converting them into bonds (e.g. Brady-
Bonds), or “selling” them to the IFIs. Some authors claim that the main aim of these 
plans was to avert a financial crisis in the west (PETTIFOR/GREENHILL 2002, S.13). 
Nevertheless, the Brady Plan was successful with respect to the problem of debt 
overhang (ARSLANALP/HENRY 2005). Since the early 1990s, however, official debt is in 
the centre of the political activity. The Paris Club, a group of creditor countries with 19 
permanent members, agreed on various debt cancellations and rescheduling programs, ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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focusing on the rescheduling of ODA debt and a partial cancellation of Non-ODA 
debt.1 The so-called London Terms were formulated in 1991 and provided up to 50 
percent reduction of Non-ODA debt. The Paris Club agreements contained some rather 
vague clauses that took a country’s need for debt forgiveness or rescheduling into 
account and should have stipulated adjustment programs in the creditor countries.2 
With the introduction of the Cologne Terms in 1999, the Paris Club creditor countries 
accepted to raise the level of debt cancellation for the poorest countries up to 90 
percent or even more if necessary. This debt forgiveness is taking place within the 
framework of the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Cologne 
terms are implemented on a case by case basis. To qualify for these terms, debtor 
countries have to show continuing strong economic adjustments (PARIS CLUB 2006b). 
Given these terms, one could expect that the debt relief plans implemented by the Paris 
Club in recent history stipulated sound policies in debtor countries and therefore 
contributed to economic growth in these countries. 
However, the debt relief initiatives until the mid-1990s did not solve the debt problem. 
Many developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, rather experienced a 
dramatic rise of their external debt over two decades. The constant difficulties to meet 
their debt obligations can be traced back to several factors, including exogenous 
shocks, such as the deterioration in the terms of trade, civil strife, a lack of sustained 
adjustment or the denial of structural reforms, improper lending behavior of creditors, 
and the lack of prudent debt management policies by debtor countries (BOOTE/THUGGE 
1997, p. 4). In the face of the fact that the traditional mechanisms for dealing with the 
debt problem of the HIPC could not solve this problem sufficiently, in 1996 the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries initiative was launched by the IMF and the World Bank, 
focusing on the debt burden of the poorest countries in the world by reducing the 
multilateral debt of these countries. The main goal was to reduce debt burdens to a 
sustainable level, which was defined as a debt-to-export ratio within the range between 
                                                      
1   All in all, the agreements reached by the members of the Paris Club since the mid-1980s covered an amount of more 
than $500 billion so far. Of course, the amount of the debt that had been actually forgiven falls way behind the 
amount negotiated. 
2   “Debt treatments are applied only for countries that need a rescheduling and that implement reforms to resolve 
their payment difficulties. In practice conditionality is provided by the existence of an appropriate programme 
supported by the IMF, which demonstrates the need for debt relief.” (PARIS CLUB 2006a) ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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200 to 250 percent, and a ratio of debt service to exports within a range of 20 to 25 
percent, all in net present value-terms (NPV). For the first time, this initiative included 
the main multilateral creditors such as the IMF, the International Development 
Association (IDA), and the African Development Fund (AfDB). The HIPC initiative 
introduced some guiding principles regarding a country’s eligibility for debt relief. To 
be considered for HIPC Initiative assistance, a country must face an unsustainable debt 
burden, beyond traditionally available debt-relief mechanisms, and establish a track 
record of reform and sound policies through IMF- and IDA-supported programs. In 
late 1999, the HIPC initiative was expanded in order to provide deeper and more rapid 
debt relief to a larger number of countries. The enhanced HIPC initiative (HIPC II) 
integrated debt relief plans into a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy requiring 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) on a broad-based participatory process as a 
necessary condition to qualify for debt relief. With this approach, the global donor 
community for the first time took governance structures in the debtor countries (at 
least implicitly) into account. Furthermore, the thresholds for sustainable debt levels 
were redefined and lowered to a debt-per-export ratio of 150 percent and a debt-to-
revenue ratio of 250 percent. The eligibility of a country is proved in a staged process. 
If a country is deemed eligible, the debt relief is delivered at the so-called completion 
point. During the period of the initial decision point and the completion point, the 
progress of the country with respect to institutional reforms and structural adjustments 
is under observation and supported by the IMF and the World Bank.3 In practise the 
time span between HIPC II and the completion point is rather large (IMF/IDA 2004, 
Annex III). Some countries still wait for reaching the completion point.  
Contrary to some traditional debt relief programs the HIPC initiative and especially 
the HIPC II initiative emphasize explicitly on poverty reduction and the institutional 
dimensions of economic development in low-income countries. Once the awarding 
procedures of multilateral creditors and the Paris Club members really followed these 
conditions, one could expect that debt relief since the late 1990s has been provided 
almost exclusively to countries that fulfilled these conditions, which would be a good 
sign with respect to the expected success of recent debt relief programs. 
                                                      
3   For further details on the HIPC II initiatives see ANDREWS ET AL. (1999). ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
6
3  THE LITERATURE  
3.1  THE RATIONALE OF DEBT RELIEF 
One popular efficiency argument for the provision of debt relief is the so called ‘debt 
overhang’.4 It has been stated that highly indebted countries benefit very little, if ever, 
from the returns on any additional investment because of the debt service obligation. 
Large debt obligations – so the underlying argumentation – can be seen as a high tax 
on investment, policy reforms and development because a significant part of the gains 
from economic adjustment would go to foreign creditors and not to the country itself. 
Put another way, the higher the stock of external debt, the higher are the opportunity 
costs of current sacrifices for the sake of future economic growth. This is the basis for 
the hypothesis of the debt Laffer curve which refers to the relationship between the 
size of a country’s debt and the value of repayments. The net present value of debt 
repayments increases with the face value of total debt up to a certain threshold.   
Beyond this level of indebtedness a higher face value of debt is associated with lower 
efforts and investments, lower economic growth and therefore with a lower (expected) 
net present value of debt service. Creditors should therefore provide a debt relief to 
countries with large stocks of external debt in order to reduce future debt obligations. 
This would increase the share of any marginal gains from economic adjustments that 
goes to the debtor country and create incentives to make these adjustments (CORDEN 
1991). This strategy could end up in a win-win-situation by not only easing the debt 
burden of debtors but also increasing future repayments to the creditors.5 Debt 
overhang is also supposed to depress growth by increasing private investors’ uncer-
tainty about actions the government might take to meet its debt-servicing obligations, 
such as a sudden and stark increase of money supply causing inflation 
(CLEMENTS/BHATTACHARYA/NGUYEN 2005), or distorting future tax policies.  
                                                      
4   The concept of debt overhang was initially introduced by SACHS (1983). See also SACHS (1989). KRUGMAN (1988) 
defined debt overhang as a situation in which the expected repayment on foreign debt falls short of the contractual 
value of the debt. 
5   TENGSTAM (2006) provides a multi-period model to show that debt relief stimulates adjustment even in the absence 
of an initial debt overhang and questions the hypothesis that a too generous debt relief might reduce the adjustment 
efforts of developing countries. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Several studies have examined the existence of a debt overhang in developing coun-
tries. Despite a few ambivalent and mixed results6, the empirical literature mainly 
provides support of the debt overhang hypothesis. DESHPANDE (1997) finds the debt 
overhang effect to be valid for a small sample of 13 countries in the period from 1971 to 
1991. PATTILLO/POIRSON/RICCI (2002) using panel regressions for 93 developing 
countries over the period 1969-1998 suggest that debt levels beyond 160-170 percent of 
the exports or 35-40 percent of GDP are detrimental to growth. BHATTACHARYA/ 
CLEMENTS (2004) estimate the debt overhang threshold at about 50 percent of GDP for 
the face value of external debt and about 100-105 percent of exports for the net present 
value of external debt based on data over the period 1970-1999 for a group of 55 low-
income countries. IMBS/RANCIERE (2005) provide non-parametric evidence supporting 
the existence of a debt Laffer curve among developing countries. Their results indicate 
that debt overhang occurs when the face value of debt reaches 60 percent of GDP or 
200 percent of exports. Since both theoretical literature and empirical evidence suggest 
that huge debt burdens tend to be associated with low investment and economic 
growth in low-income countries, debt relief might have a stimulating effect on invest-
ment and economic development.  
This justification of debt relief seems to be quite convincing at first glance. But the 
clincher with respect to the resource position of low-income countries and therefore to 
the capacity to pay its obligations – at least in the short run – and to invest is still the 
net resource transfer from donors, including bilateral and multilateral aid which is of 
special importance for HIPCs. Since the reduction of multilateral debt is partly 
financed by bilateral donors (e.g. through their contributions to multilateral funds), 
and these contributions usually come from the same political reservoir, namely the 
donors’ aid budget, there might be a trade off between debt relief and official devel-
opment assistance (BIRDSALL/CLAESSENS/DIWAN 2002, p. 10). As MARTIN  (2004) 
suggests, there is evidence of aid diversion to fund debt relief. However, the empirical 
literature on additionality of debt relief does not provide strong support for these 
                                                      
6   CLAESSENS (1990) generally confirms the existence of the debt Laffer curve in a sample of 29 highly indebted Sub-
Saharan African countries but found only a handful of countries being on the “wrong” side of the inverted U-curve. 
HANSEN (2001), recognizing a negative impact of the initial stock of external debt and debt service on growth for 54 
developing countries, stressed that these relationships become insignificant once some policy indicators are added 
to the regression model. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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qualms about debt relief. NDIKUMANA (2003) investigating the relationship between 
debt alleviation programs and official development assistance (ODA) does not find a 
direct causal link between the volume of debt relief or debt forgiveness respectively 
and the volume of ODA disbursed, although the total supply of ODA and grants 
declined in the 1990s. HERNÁNDEZ/KATADA (1996) find a slight crowding-out effect 
between ODA debt relief and new lending from bilateral resources in a sample of 32 
Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1989-1993. While there is at least no 
clear cut empirical evidence of a crowding out of ODA or other sources of finance by 
debt relief, there is no evidence for additionality either. In the face of very little, if not 
zero additionality, the question becomes whether it is better to have debt relief or more 
conventional forms of aid (BIRD/MILNE 2000, p. 201).  
Furthermore, taking the net resource transfer given to highly indebted low-income 
countries into account, the incentive argument becomes more complex than in the 
traditional debt overhang theory. If the net resource transfer from donors is positively 
related to a country’s level of indebtedness, the (dis)incentive effects of initial external 
debts and debt services to invest and to repay the credits may switch to the opposite 
direction. BIRD/MILNE (2003) show that higher levels of outstanding debt are usually 
associated with higher levels of net resource transfers from official sources. This fact 
contradicts the hypothesis of debt overhang: countries that increase their capacity (and 
willingness) to pay are expected to receive less future resource transfers. The disincen-
tives to introduce promising but costly adjustments do not occur because of the so 
called debt overhang but because of the tax on development, which stems from the 
declining share in aid budgets given to relatively successful developing countries. The 
findings of CORDELLA/RICCI/RUIZ-ARRANZ (2005) give in a way support to this 
hypothesis. The authors found that in HIPCs indebtedness did not affect either 
investments or growth. In their findings the so called debt irrelevance threshold is 
situated between 50 and 60 percent of GDP.7 One explanation is that severely indebted 
low-income countries benefit most from the resource transfer provided by donors. 
                                                      
7    The authors suggest that at intermediate levels of debt, there is a negative relation between the degree of 
indebtedness and economic growth. According to their study, the debt to GDP overhang lies between 25 and 40 
percent. Once the debt irrelevance threshold is reached, this relation becomes nil.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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BIRDSALL/CLAESSEN/DIWAN (2002) suggest that net transfers are larger in high debt and 
especially in the high multilateral debt regimes. Countries with high debt ratios and 
high debts due to multinational institutions have received larger net transfers. This can 
be interpreted as a debt subsidy rather than a debt tax.  
Considering these theoretical and empirical findings, on the one hand, high debt 
burdens seem to be detrimental to economic growth in low-income countries. On the 
other hand, because of the crucial role of net transfers especially through bilateral and 
multilateral aid and because of ambivalent incentive effects, it is far from sure that debt 
relief alone can enhance further economic growth in highly indebted poor countries. In 
the next sub-section we will give a brief overview of the existing literature on the 
effectiveness of debt relief. 
3.2  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEBT RELIEF 
Any debt relief would be economically irrational if the success was low. Therefore, 
future policy measures should be based on careful analysis with respect to effective-
ness (and efficiency8). Is debt relief a proper instrument to reduce debt overhang, to 
diminish poverty, to increase growth and to improve governance structures? 
HERNÁNDEZ/KATADA (1996) analysing grants and ODA debt forgiveness to 32 Sub-
Saharan African countries reveal that debt relief did not reduce the debt overhang of 
Sub-Saharan African countries at all, but that the nominal debt stock of many countries 
even doubled between 1984 and 1993 and their arrears increased dramatically. The 
authors suggest that it may be the case that the ODA debt which had been forgiven 
was not being serviced, indicating that debt relief activities have not freed additional 
resources for the recipient countries. They also find that receiving more debt relief did 
not increase a country’s import capacity. Some countries that have received less debt 
relief have been able to expand their imports more than countries that have received 
debt relief to a substantially larger extent. This shows that debt relief does not free 
resources because the written-off debt has not been serviced.  
                                                      
8   The literature concentrates on effectiveness, one exception being ARSANALP/HENRY (2005) who claim to deal with 
efficiency, but rather model effectiveness. Efficiency would imply that an objective is met with a minimum of 
resources. This question is barely discussed in the literature. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Since the opinion that decent institutions and governance structures play a crucial role 
for economic development and growth has become almost consensus in the economic 
literature9, the question remains if debt forgiveness can be expected to contribute to 
improvements of governance quality in low-income countries, creating institutional 
conditions that are conducive to economic growth.  
CHAUVIN/KRAAY (2005) show for 62 developing countries that debt relief between 1989 
and 2003 did not improve the institutional quality, nor did it lead to rising FDI or 
higher rates of economic growth. EASTERLY (1999) finds that highly indebted poor 
countries became highly indebted mainly because of poor policies not because of 
external shocks or wars. He estimates a statistically significant association between 
debt relief and new net borrowing in 40 HIPCs during the period 1989-1997. He 
concludes that official lenders did not follow prudential rules and the IMF and World 
Bank provided far more financing to HIPCs over 1979-1997 than to other developing 
countries of similar income levels although the policies in many HIPCs have been 
worse. Given these rather unsatisfying results, the effectiveness of debt relief with 
respect to governance quality and economic development in low-income countries 
becomes highly questionable, because it might cause moral hazard and incentives to 
delay institutional reforms necessary for growth. BAUER (1991) raises moral hazard and 
disincentive issues, too, claiming that the beneficiaries of debt relief are those govern-
ments that have not fulfilled their obligations and have been allowed to do so very 
largely unscathed. THOMAS (2001) points out, that some HIPCs had no policy re-
sponses to poverty, HIV/AIDS, or corruption until they were required to do so as 
conditions for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. Therefore, he suggests, unless debt 
relief is effectively conditioned on the proper use of funds and the pursuit of structural 
reforms, it is unlikely to help the poor.10  
 
                                                      
9   See  RODRIK/SUBRAMANIAN/TREBBI  (2004). SACHS (2003) questions the dominance of institutions and claims that 
geographical conditions are of special relevance for economic development. 
10   “Even worse, debt-relief funds may be used to support activities that actually worsen poverty, such as war…” 
(THOMAS 2001, p. 42). However, the pleading for strong conditionality in order to force developing countries to 
introduce reforms is not undisputed. DOLLAR/SVENSSON (2000), analyzing the failure of structural adjustment 
programs, claim that the role of donors is to identify reformers, not to create them. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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CLEMENTS/BHATTACHARYA/NGUYEN (2005) using data for 55 low-income countries 
over the period 1970-1999 find that large debt burdens have not seriously hampered 
public investment in low-income countries and that in most cases debt relief has lead 
to greater public consumption rather than investment that could have contributed to 
further economic growth. Taking into account that only a relatively small share of debt 
is supposed to be channelled into public investment, the impact o f  d e b t  r e l i e f  o n  
growth will at best be modest.  
To the contrary, ARSLANALP/HENRY (2005) show that the debt restructuring and 
reduction under the Brady Plan led to rising asset prices, increased investment, and 
faster growth in the 16 countries that received Brady deals between 1989 and 1995. 
According to the authors, the Brady Plan worked quite well because debt relief was 
granted to a group of middle-income developing countries where debt overhang 
genuinely stood in the way of profitable new lending and investment. It is far from 
certain that the positive results of the Brady Plan can be used to forecast the potential 
impact of further debt relief on HIPCs (ARSLANALP/HENRY 2005, p. 1048). Conse-
quently, ARSLANALP/HENRY (2006) do not expect that further debt relief will address 
the fundamental problem of inadequate economic institutions that impedes investment 
and growth in the world’s poorest countries. In their opinion, the (indirect) approach 
of debt relief does little, if any, good.  
Given the overwhelming evidence that debt relief cannot be expected to have notable 
positive effects on governance quality and economic growth, why do creditor countries 
actually grant debt forgiveness and what are the main determinants of the allocation of 
debt relief?  
3.3  THE DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RELIEF 
As debt relief has been barely effective, it makes sense to study its determinants. They 
obviously deviate from economic reasoning as discussed in section 3.1. This is exempli-
fied by HERNÁNDEZ/KATADA (1996). They argue that neither absolute poverty nor lack 
of access to foreign exchange (through exports) had been criteria in allocating ODA 
debt relief and pure grants during the period 1989-1993.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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MICHAELOWA (2003) provides a theoretical explanation for this evidence. In a political 
economic model based on the utility maximizing behavior of the political actors 
participating in the decision making process of debt relief programs she argues that, if 
politicians and international bureaucrats realize that default risks become very high, 
they prefer to grant debt relief in order to conceal their imprudent past lending and to 
“sell” the renunciation of funds as an innovative poverty reduction measure, especially 
if lobbying by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in favour of debt relief 
increases their chances of obtaining positive public credit for the delivered debt relief. 
The enhanced HIPC initiative serves as an example. 
Empirical evidence is in line with this reasoning. BIRDSALL/CLAESSEN/DIWAN (2002, 
2003), analyzing a sample of 37 Sub-Saharan African countries, prove that debt relief 
between 1977 and 1998 has been rather independent on policy variables in high debt 
countries whereas net transfers are more dependent on governance indicators in the 
low debt regimes. Consequently, they suggest that the international community as a 
whole seems to be less selective with respect to the institutional quality of high debt 
countries. The authors also find that policy selectivity has declined over time and that 
in the 1990s multilateral and bilateral donors were actually financing bad policies in 
high debt countries. NEUMAYER (2002) finds very little evidence for a connection 
between the quality of governance and the allocation of debt forgiveness between 1989 
and 1998. Only one out of six governance indicators seemed to be a statistically 
significant determinant of whether or not a country is deemed eligible for receiving 
debt relief. 
ALESINA/WEDER (2002) point out, that corrupt governments following very poor 
policies have received just as much aid and debt relief as less corrupt ones. According 
to their empirical study, covering several time periods between 1970 and 1995, there is 
not even weak evidence of a negative effect of corruption on received foreign aid or 
debt relief. ALESINA/DOLLAR (2000) find a strategic nature of aid, which implies the 
same behavior of donors with respect to debt relief. They use control variables such as 
colonial status (number of years in the 20th century in which countries have been 
colonies), FDI flow relative to GDP and UN voting patterns.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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In sum, theoretical literature and empirical evidence clearly show that it is not the 
governance quality or the effort for better economic and political circumstances that 
drives debt relief.  
4  IS GOOD GOVERNANCE A DRIVER FOR DEBT RELIEF – 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
This section deals with the determinants of debt relief from the perspective of the 
creditor countries. As it is designed in the Enhanced HIPCs Initiative that only those 
countries receive debt forgiveness that seriously reform their institutional setting and 
their economic policy, it seems adequate to look behind the motives of creditor 
countries. There are several determinants of debt relief one can think of. First, it may be 
the case that debt relief is given on the basis of economic reasoning. This would imply 
that debt relief is expected to free additional resources and enhance economic growth, 
and, because of the importance of good governance for economic development, that 
good governance is rewarded and bad governance is sanctioned. In this case, one 
would expect that debt relief is more successful with respect to economic performance 
and improvements of governance quality than documented in the literature. We 
discuss the hypothesis that debt relief programs have contributed to economic growth 
and to improvements in governance quality (H1) in section 5.2. 
Another justification for debt relief could be the existence of the so called debt burden, 
which we will test in Stage 2. Since high levels of indebtedness seem to be detrimental 
to growth in low-income countries, debt forgiveness could be one way to enhance 
economic development in HIPCs. Therefore, the amount of debt relief should be 
positively related to the level of indebtedness, which is the second hypothesis (H2) to 
be tested.  
However, a political economy perspective rather suggests a different theoretical 
reasoning along the lines raised by MICHAELOWA (2003). According to this reasoning, 
politicians in donor countries do not like to admit policy errors. Suppose that despite 
(or even because of) past debt relief, the debtor country did not improve its economic 
and political situation. Nevertheless, politically rational governments in creditor ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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countries would not take this result as a signal to stop their activities as this would be a 
confession of bad economic policy in the recent past. Rather, they would find argu-
ments for further debt relief measures.11 Applied to the three sub-periods we have 
chosen, one would then expect a path dependence. Our third hypothesis (H3) goes as 
follows: debt relief in the second and third sub-period is positively related to the 
amount of debt forgiven in the first, and the first and second sub-period respectively. 
For governments in rich countries there may be another incentive for debt relief, 
namely poverty, in particular poverty to be observed in the daily news. Famines, 
natural catastrophes and the like can be instrumentalized when the government is not 
willing or able to run different and probably more effective development policies such 
as opening foreign trade for agricultural products and Heckscher-Ohlin goods.12  Debt 
relief then is a politically cheap, but economically expensive form of publicly visible 
development policy. Thereby, the government again can improve its position against 
the country’s opposition that cannot argue against it without appearing heartless and 
stingy. Therefore, one could expect debt relief to be positively correlated with the 
degree of poverty, which is our fourth hypothesis (H4) to be tested.  
Another determinant of debt relief may be the abundance of natural resources. 
Especially oil exporting countries may be more easily subject to debt forgiveness than 
others, as their governments have to be treated carefully by industrialized countries.13 
A reasonable hypothesis (H5) is that oil exporting countries receive more debt relief 
than others.  
                                                      
11   The political gains can even be increased if the debt relief initiative is a joint undertaking of many countries. In 
particular, the G8 provides a good platform for its members’ governments to gain a competitive edge against the 
opposition at home. By forming a front, the governments can agree and assign each other greater competence. Thus, 
the opposition has moral as well as medial difficulties to argue against the policy deal. In addition, the moral and 
intellectual support of NGOs demanding for debt relief can be obtained. This sort of history-related path depend-
ence can be extended by looking at colonial history. Countries which in the past were colonies of European G8-
members may be treated more generously than others. For a theoretical analysis see VAUBEL (1991), for an applica-
tion (to the G8’s initiative to bridge the global digital divide) see FREYTAG (2003). 
12   This does not say that debt relief is useless in any poor country. The evidence however suggests that debt relief is 
more helpful in middle income countries to reduce the debt overhang (ARSLANALP/HENRY 2006) and that poor 
countries are poor mainly because of poor governance (EASTERLY 1999).  
13   The fact that a country exports oil can be interpreted as “economic proximity” to major OECD countries which 
consume the largest share of the world’s oil production. BARRO/LEE (2005) suggest that economic proximity to the 
United States and major Western European countries is positively related to the probability and the size of IMF 
loans a country gets. The oil abundance of Iran may be one reason for the intensive negotiating efforts the EU is 
undertaking to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear strategy. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Thus, according to the hypotheses H2-H5 debt relief for developing country i can be 
interpreted as a function of debt relief, the actual debt burden, debt relief in the past, 
the colonial history, the degree of a country’s poverty, and a dummy for oil exporting 
countries.  
One can also formulate an alternative hypothesis, namely that governments in creditor 
countries are able to learn and to distinguish debtor countries from each other. The 
justification is that the knowledge and awareness about both the elusiveness of debt 
relief and the enormous impact of institutions on economic development is rather new 
– at least in terms of publicly accepted knowledge. This would imply that creditor 
countries’ governments do take into account governance quality or changes in the 
governance structures of debtor countries more carefully in later periods of debt relief. 
It does, however, not imply that the other determinants are irrelevant.  
Our alternative hypothesis, that good governance (H6a) or improvements of govern-
ance quality (H6b) influence the amount of debt forgiveness in the third sub-period 
positively, assumes economic rationality to a greater extent than the first one. Besides 
the variables defined for H2-H5, the governance quality and changes in the governance 
structures over time are relevant according to H6a and H6b.  
We will test our hypotheses empirically in the following section.  
5  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section reports the results of the empirical analysis. We do cross country estimates 
for three periods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004). We start by giving a brief overview 
on various debt relief programs in recent history. In sub-section 5.1 we introduce the 
database for 127 developing countries in the period 1990-2004. After that, in “Stage 1” 
we assess whether debt relief contributes to higher growth and improvements of 
governance structures (H1). In “Stage 2” we test our theoretical considerations about 
the determinants of debt relief (H2-H6).  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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5.1  DATA 
The data comprises of macroeconomic variables, a variety of institutional variables 
describing the quality of governance structures as well as different control variables. 
We split the period into three sub-periods, namely 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004, 
and use average data for these sub-periods. We have chosen these sub-periods because 
the second and third sub-period almost match the introduction of the HIPC I and HIPC 
II initiative respectively.14 Another reason is that some variables we use, especially debt 
relief, occur in a rather discontinuous manner, and some data are not available for 
every single year.  
The sum of debt relief for the countries in our sample between 1990 and 2004 amounts 
to about US$ 51 billion (face value). We use data on debt relief reported by the Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 2006). These include the forgiveness of loans reported by 
creditor countries as a component of official development assistance (ODA). Further 
data on debt are taken from the Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics on external 
debt.15 It may be argued that the face value of debt and debt relief is not appropriate to 
calculate their economic effects and some authors already claimed that one should 
rather use net present value terms. Although a few attempts to calculate the net present 
value of debt relief have been made, no comprehensive database on the net present 
value of debt relief calculated on a loan-by-loan basis exists so far. Since the reliability 
of the existing estimations of debt relief in net present value terms is questionable, we 
use the reported face values.  
A second argument for this way of proceeding is that we are up to analyze the effects 
and justification of debt relief from the donors’ point of view, or – so to speak – from 
the perspective of OECD countries’ tax payers. One can also argue that from the 
creditors’ perspective, the net present value of the loans does not matter in reality 
because the probability that HIPCs would have met their obligation (including interest 
etc.) can be expected to be close to zero, anyway. Therefore, it is the reported (nominal) 
                                                      
14   Although some HIPCs received debt relief in the HIPC initiative framework in the second sub-period, the vast 
amount of debt forgiveness has been delivered in the third sub-period. 
15   THE WORLD BANK 2006. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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amount of debt relief provided that counts (among others as a “selling” argument for 
tax payers, NGOs etc.). Donor countries usually report the amount of debt relief in face 
value terms.  
Finally, since we discuss the problem of additionality of debt relief our method can be 
justified because of the possible trade off between debt relief and real resource transfer 
through ODA.  
Our main economic indicators, such as GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita, and data 
on international trade, are taken from IMF (2006) and WTO (2006) sources. The 
descriptive statistics referring to GDP per capita, total external debt per GDP, debt 
service per exports, and debt relief per GDP are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
   Min  Max  Mean  Standard  dev. 
Sub-period 1 (1990-1994)        
GDP per capita (PPP)    406,61  11.550,80  2.735,60  2.140,92 
Total external debt in % of GDP    1,81  780,25  94,18  118,52 
Debt service in percent of exports    0,10  67,30  15,18  12,48 
Debt relief in % of GDP   0,00  37,41  2,33  5,32 
Sub-period 2 (1995-1999)        
GDP per capita (PPP)    473,92  12.146,02  3.131,44  2.472,80 
Total external debt in % of GDP    8,70  750,93  89,99  102,50 
Debt service in percent of exports    0,00  40,26  12,82  8,90 
Debt relief in % of GDP   0,00  47,06  2,87  7,56 
Sub-period 3 (2000-2004)        
GDP per capita (PPP)    542,33  25.738,3916  3.903,63 3.545,42 
Total external debt in % of GDP    6,15  650,63  80,91  81,77 
Debt service in percent of exports    0,45  52,08  11,65  9,11 
Debt relief in % of GDP    0,00  106,04  4,90  12,85 
The reported data are the average values in the three sub-periods. 
The number of countries covered by the variables varies between 99 and 120 because of missing values in the different 
categories and sub-periods. 
 
 
                                                      
16   The discovery and exploitation of large oil reserves in Equatorial Guinea caused a tremendous economic growth in 
recent years.   ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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We use additional data on public expenditures, FDI, colonial history, religion dum-
mies, a landlock dummy, a dummy for oil exporting countries, HIV/AIDS and the 
Human Development Index reported in the CIA World Factbook (2006), by the WHO 
(2006), the UNESCO (2006), and the Human Development Reports (HDR 2006).  
The fact that not all data are available for every single country reduces our sample size 
in most of our regressions.  
To guarantee reliability in one of the major variables in our analysis, we use govern-
ance indicators from different sources. Our data set covers the following governance 
indicators (source in parenthesis): 
 
1.  Civil Liberties (Freedom House)17 
2.  Political Rights (Freedom House) 
3.  Corruption Perceptions Index / CPI (Transparency International)18 
4.  Voice & Accountability (World Bank / KKM)19 
5.  Political Stability & Absence of Violence (World Bank / KKM) 
6.  Government Effectiveness (World Bank / KKM) 
7.  Regulatory Quality (World Bank / KKM) 
8.  Rule of Law (World Bank / KKM) 
9.  Control of Corruption (World Bank / KKM) 
10. Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation)20 
11. Economic Freedom of the World (Fraser Institute)21 
 
The indicators “Civil Liberties” (1) and “Political Rights” (2) provided by Freedom 
House on a yearly basis covering the whole period 1990-2004 have been transformed so 
that higher values indicate “better” performance. The original indicators range from 1 
(“free”) to 7 (“not free”). The survey includes both analytical reports and numerical 
                                                      
17   FREEDOM HOUSE 2005. 
18   TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 2005. 
19   For the methodology of aggregating governance indicators see KAUFMANN/KRAAY/ MASTRUZZI (KKM) (2005) and 
KAUFMANN/KRAAY/ZOIDO-LOBATÓN (1999). 
20   HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2006. 
21   FRASER INSTITUTE 2005. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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ratings. The survey findings are reached after a multi-layered process of analysis and 
evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars.22  
The “Corruption Perceptions Index” (CPI) (3) ranks the countries in terms of perceived 
levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The 
sources measure the overall extent of corruption in the public and political sectors.23 
The CPI Score, ranging between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean), is only 
available for a larger group of countries for the second and third of our sub-periods.  
The same holds for the aggregated governance indicators estimated by World Bank 
staff, which are provided in a 2 years cycle. The indicator “Voice & Accountability” (4) 
includes a number of measures of the political process, civil liberties, political and 
human rights. “Political Stability & Absence of Violence” (5) combines several indica-
tors that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. “Government 
Effectiveness” (6) combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the 
civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the governmentʹs commit-
ment to policies.  
“Regulatory Quality” (7) focuses on the policies themselves, including measures of the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in 
areas such as foreign trade and business development. The indicator “Rule of Law” (8) 
includes several measures of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
“Control of Corruption” (9) is a measure of the extent of corruption, conventionally 
defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. It is based on scores of 
variables from polls of experts and surveys (THE WORLD BANK 2005). The six indicators 
are normalized in every reported year range from -2.5 to 2.5 and have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one. Higher values indicate “better” governance.  
                                                      
22   For a documentation of the methodology see FREEDOM HOUSE (2005). 
23   For a documentation of the methodology see LAMBSDORFF (2005). ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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The “Index of Economic Freedom” (10) provided by the Heritage Foundation includes 
a broad array of institutional factors determining economic freedom, especially 
corruption in the judiciary, and government bureaucracy, non-tariff barriers to trade, 
the fiscal burden of government, the rule of law, efficiency within the judiciary, and the 
ability to enforce contracts, regulatory burdens on business, restrictions on banks, labor 
market regulations, and informal market activities, including corruption, smuggling, 
piracy of intellectual property rights. We transformed the index so that higher scores 
indicate an economic environment or set of policies that are most conducive to 
economic freedom. The original score ranges from 1 to 5, where higher scores signify 
lower economic freedom. 
“Economic Freedom in the World” (11) calculated by the Fraser Institute measures the 
degree of economic freedom present in the five areas “Size of Government”, “Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights”, “Access to Sound Money”, “Freedom to 
Trade Internationally”, and “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business”. This indicator 
is a broad measure of conditions that are supposed to be supportive for economic 
growth.24 Within the five major areas, 21 components are incorporated into the index 
but many of those components are themselves made up of several sub-components.25 
The scale runs from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate a higher degree of economic 
freedom. We use data from the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.  
5.2  STAGE ONE – DID DEBT RELIEF BRING OUT ANY GOOD? 
First, we discuss the first hypothesis (H1) claiming that debt relief provided in the first 
and second of our sub-periods improved the economic development in low-income 
countries. The literature is explicit about the poor effectiveness of debt relief (and 
development aid). We have used our database to control whether or not our data is in 
accordance to the general thrust of the literature (see also sub-section 3.2). The results 
of an OLS-model (with White correction because of possible heteroscedasticity) show 
                                                      
24   Interestingly, the correlation between the Fraser Index and most of the other institutional variables is pretty low., 
especially in the second sub-period. The coefficients of correlation are significantly higher in the third sub-period 
but still do not indicate a strong correlation. 
25   GWARTNEY/LAWSON/GARTZKE (2005) provide a documentation of the methodology. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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that neither economic growth (measured by GDP per capita in PPP-$) nor governance 
indicators were positively influenced by debt relief during our estimation period 1990 
through 2004, which one would expect. 26  
We also test whether ODA aid contributed to growth and better governance and again 
have to reject the hypothesis. The only variables that were positively correlated with 
growth are governance indicators.  
The economic freedom of a country measured by the Fraser Index (FRASER) has – as 
expected – a positive and preponderant significant effect on economic development in 
most of our estimations. We controlled our estimations for variables such as geo-
graphical specification, namely a dummy for a country’s access to oceans (landlock-
dummy), a dummy for the dominating religion (Christian, Muslim or other), a dummy 
that indicates if the country is an oil exporter, and some other factors, such as the stock 
and the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Although some of these variables 
show the expected signs (e.g. LANDLOCK) and add some explanatory power to our 
models, this extra explanatory power is negligibly small and most of the variables 
showed themselves highly insignificant, besides FDI that contribute significantly 
positive to growth in some of our regressions. The answer to the question if debt relief 
has brought out any good with respect to the economic development in low-income 
countries so far is disillusioning. All in all, our results suggest that debt relief programs 
in the 1990s have not lead to higher economic growth in the world’s poorest countries. 
According to the results of some of our estimations, neither ODA did. The same holds 
with respect to governance. We cannot identify a positive relationship between debt 
relief and governance indicators in the second and third sub-periods. Debt relief did 
not contribute to better governance in highly indebted countries in the 1990s and the 
early 21st century. Our estimations do not produce even the weakest relation between 
the amount of debt relief and governance indicators. Our first hypothesis (H1), in line 
with the existing literature on this issue, is thus to be rejected. Debt relief in the period 
from 1990 to 1999 did not contribute to better economic performance and political 
conditions in most developing countries.  
                                                      
26   We do not report the results as they document only a very loose relation between the dependent and the exogenous 
variables.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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5.3  STAGE TWO – THE DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RELIEF 
If not the economic and political development of low-income countries, what drives 
the decision of policymakers in industrialized countries for more debt relief? This 
question is addressed by the hypotheses 2 through 6 of section 4. We use a Tobit 
regression to test the hypotheses empirically. We start with the sub-period 1995-1999 in 
section 5.3.1, and proceed with the sub-period 2000-2004 sub-section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1  DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RELIEF DURING THE 1990S 
Our dependent variable is the amount of debt relief awarded in the sub-period 1995-
1999 relative to the average GDP in this sub-period. Since quite a few countries in our 
sample did not receive any debt relief at all and therefore the distribution of the 
dependent variable is skewed, we apply (left-censored) Tobit estimation techniques to 
distinguish between countries that received debt relief and those who did not, and to 
take into account the amount of debt relief relative to GDP at the same time. By doing 
so we do not only cover the question of whether or not a country had been found to be 
eligible for a debt relief, which is the first step if one wants to identify determinants of 
debt forgiveness, but also address the assumption that a factor that has a positive effect 
on the probability of receiving any debt relief should also influence the amount of the 
debt forgiveness positively.27  
ε X ß X β s eperexport Debtservic
ODAperGDP β DRperGDP β DebtperGDP β c   DRperGDP
N N M M 2
1 3 1 2 2 1 2
+ + + +
+ + + =
 
with DebtperGDP2 being the debt stock relative to the GDP in sub-period 2, DRperGDP1 
the amount of debt relief relative to the GDP in sub-period 1, ODAperGDP1 the aid to 
GDP ratio in sub-period 1, Debtserviceperexports2  being the ratio of debt service per 
exports in sub-period 2, XM representing a vector of institutional variables and XN 
representing a vector of controls. We use each governance indicator separately because 
we want to identify governance dimensions that might have been weighted stronger 
by donor countries when they decided about granting debt forgiveness. 
                                                      
27   NEUMAYER (2002, p. 920), using the same technique to prove if good governance has been rewarded, gives a similar 
justification.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Table 2:  Tobit estimation I-VI for the determinants of debt relief in sub-period 2 (1995-1999) 
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FRASER 
(sub-period 2) 
   
0.48 
(0.76) 
    
CIVLIB 
(sub-period 2) 












      
-0.68 
(0.69) 
N 110  103  103  68  110  110  99 
Adj.  R-squared  0.762 0.765 0.768 0.792 0.761 0.761  0.801 
Dependent variable is the amount of debt relief per GDP in sub-period 2 (1995-1999).  Absolute z-values in parentheses.  
*  Significant at the 90 percent level. 
**  Significant at the 95 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the major part of the variance of the amount of debt relief per 
GDP in the second half of the 1990s can be explained by the country’s indebtedness in 
the period 1995-1999 measured by external debt per GDP28, the amount of debt relief 
per GDP awarded in the first sub-period (1990-1994), and the amount of ODA per GDP 
provided in this sub-period, with debt relief per GDP being most influential and highly 
significant. 
These results can be interpreted as follows. First, creditor countries took the indebted-
ness of a country into account when they decided if this very country should receive 
debt forgiveness. Second, the degree of the indebtedness of a country seems to be 
positively correlated to the relative amount of the debt relief provided. At first glance, 
these results seem to confirm our second hypothesis (H2). Interestingly, the strong 
positive relation between the debt burden and the amount of debt relief does not occur 
                                                      
28   Using the initial indebtedness at the beginning of the second sub-period as explanatory variable we got very similar 
results. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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if we add (or use) the amount of debt service per exports as a measure of a country’s 
debt burden (estimation II and III). The coefficient of this variable is positive but 
insignificant. Hence, it seems that the level of indebtedness had been taken into 
account by creditors to some extent, but the actual debt burden has not played a major 
role in the calculus of donors in the 1990s. This somehow confirms our conjecture that 
some severely indebted countries did not pay their obligations or at least showed 
substantial arrears. The correlation between the relative debt stock and the debt service 
per exports is remarkably low, with a coefficient of correlation just about 0.24. Creditor 
countries obviously provided higher debt forgiveness through debt restructuring, 
postponements or debt cancellation in order to prevent additional arrears, which is 
also in line with our theoretical presumptions. This, indeed, might have created even 
more disincentives to necessary adjustments in some highly indebted poor countries.  
However, the most striking result is the strong path dependence of debt relief. Once a 
country received debt forgiveness in the early 1990s, the probability of gaining from 
additional debt forgiveness in the second half of the 1990s is close to one. Furthermore, 
the higher the amount of the debt relief granted in the past, the higher is the expected 
relative debt relief in the future. The data strongly confirm our third hypothesis (H3). 
Donor countries obviously do not interpret past ODA and debt relief as “sunk costs”, 
what they clearly are.29 Contrary to reasonable economic considerations, the costs of 
past ODA and debt relief programs are not irrelevant in the decision making process 
about current and future debt forgiveness, even if it becomes clear that these “expendi-
tures” did not bring out any good with respect to economic development or govern-
ance quality.30 Governments in creditor countries did not tend to admit past errors; 
they rather accepted new ones to prevent political costs, at least in the 1990s. The 
governance indicators do not add any extra explanatory power to the estimation (see 
Table 3), but – at least – show a positive sign, indicating that governance has been 
taken into account.31 
                                                      
29   Sunk costs are costs that have already been incurred and which cannot be recovered to any significant degree. This, 
indeed, is true for debt relief and ODA payments granted in the past. 
30   It should me mentioned, that, in addition to these interesting results, we do not find evidence for a crowding out of 
ODA by debt relief in the 1990s at least in the highly indebted countries. 
31   Unfortunately, the availability of the CPI for the second sub-period did not meet our requirements. We therefore 
dropped the CPI as independent variable in our estimations.  ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Table 3:  Tobit estimation VII-XIV for the determinants of debt relief in sub-period 2 (1995-1999) 
 VII  VIII  IX  X  XI  XII  XIII  XIV 


























































       
CONTROLC 
(sub-period 2)   
2.10* 
(1.65) 
      
POLSTAB 
(sub-period 2)    
-0.50 
(0.73) 
     
REGQUAL 
(sub-period 2)     
1.27 
(1.56) 
    
RULEOFLAW 
(sub-period 2)      
0.01 
(0.01) 
   
VOICE 








O I L E X          
1.90 
(1.64) 
N  110 110  98  110 110 110 110 110 
Adj.  R-squared  0.764 0.773 0.748 0.763 0.759 0.762 0.768 0.769 
Dependent variable is the amount of debt relief per GDP in sub-period 2 (1995-1999).    
Absolute z-values in parentheses.  
*  Significant at the 90 percent level. 
**  Significant at the 95 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level. 
 
Control of Corruption is the only “promising” coefficient, being significant at the 10 
percent level and showing the expected sign (estimation VIII, Table 3). On the other 
hand, POLSTAB shows a negative sign, as does HERITAGE in estimation VII in Table 
2. All in all, the hypothesis, that donor countries have taken the state of governance 
quality into account when they were deciding about debt relief (H6a) has to be rejected 
for the second half of the 1990s.  
The other variables do not contribute to the explanation of the determinants of debt 
relief in sub-period 2. Colonial history is irrelevant, no matter if we use a variable 
counting the number of years a country was colony in the 20th century (COLON20) or 
in total (COLONTOT). Therefore, the hypothesis of the history-related path depend-ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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ence has to be dismissed. The dummy OILEX shows the expected sign and is close to 
significance. Nevertheless, we do not find support for the hypothesis that debt relief 
has been granted in favour of oil exporting countries (H5). 
5.3.2  DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RELIEF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21
ST CENTURY 
Now we turn to sub-period 3 testing the hypothesis that governments of creditor 
countries are able to learn and change the allocation pattern of debt relief with respect 
to governance quality. The dependent variable is now the amount of debt relief per 
GDP provided in the third sub-period (2000-2004). We, again, use the level of indebt-
edness, measured by the debt stock per GDP as the first independent variable. In order 
to test the path dependence found in the last section, we integrate the amount of debt 
relief relative to GDP awarded in the 1990s (sub-periods 1 and 2). We also test if the 
path dependence can be found with respect to ODA payments provided in sub-periods 
1 and 2. This leads us to the following equation that we use in Tobit estimations: 
ε X ß X β X β s eperexport Debtservic
ODAperGDP β DRperGDP β DEBTperGDP β c   DRperGDP
N N ∆M ∆M M M 2
2 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 3
+ + + + +
+ + + = + +
 
with X∆M representing a vector of changes in institutional variables. The explanatory 
power of our first two regressions in Table 4 falls way behind the comparable ones 
from the previous section. Only about 25 to 27 percent of the variance of the amount of 
debt relief awarded in the third sub-period can be explained by the level of indebted-
ness, the amount of previous debt relieves and previous ODA payments. The coeffi-
cients of the relative amount of debt relief in the past remain positive and significant, 
but the path dependence of debt relief has lost some of its weight at the beginning of 
the 21st century.32 The integration of the actual debt burden, measured by debt service 
per exports does not add any extra explanatory power to our model. Although the 
coefficient of the stock of foreign debt per GDP is positive and significant in the first 
two estimations, a country’s indebtedness does not seem to be a major determinant of 
debt relief in the third sub-period. The results do not confirm hypothesis 2. This 
becomes clear if we introduce a measure of poverty into our regressions.  
                                                      
32   This pattern does not change if we use debt relief per GDP in the second sub-period as independent variable. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Table 4:  Tobit estimation I-V for the determinants of debt relief in sub-period 3 (2000-2004) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
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OILEX      
2.12 
(1.17) 
N  109  96 74 74 74 
Adj.  R-squared  0.272 0.258 0.625 0.623 0.627 
Dependent variable is the amount of debt relief per GDP in sub-period 3 (2000-2004).    
Absolute z-values in parentheses.  
*  Significant at the 90 percent level. 
**  Significant at the 95 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level. 
 
The variable POVERTY is the percentage of the population that lived below the 
poverty line at the beginning of the 21st century. The integration of this variable adds 
much explanatory power to the model and rules out the significance of the relative 
debt stock.33 Debt relief per GDP in the previous two sub-periods remain significant 
and ODA per GDP in these two sub-periods becomes weakly significant. Controlling 
for other factors, such as colonial history and OILEX does not change the pattern of the 
estimation. 
Summarizing the findings of Table 4, it seems to be the case that recent debt relief has 
been provided primarily to the poorest countries, but still dependent of debt relief 
programs in the early 1990s. These findings give strong support to hypothesis 4. The 
level of indebtedness cannot be judged as an important determinant of debt forgive-
ness in the early 21st century.34  
                                                      
33   The correlation between POVERTY and the debt burden (irrespectively of the measure applied) is rather low.  
34   The coefficient for debt service per exports shows itself highly insignificant and even has a negative sign. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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The question, yet to be answered, is if recent debt relief has been provided to those 
countries that have shown sound policies or at least improved their governance 
quality. We tested the effects of several institutional dimensions on the allocation of the 
debt forgiveness in sub-period 3 by using the different institutional indicators sepa-
rately. Table 5 provides some promising results. The coefficients of all governance 
indicators are positive and two of them reach the 95 percent significance level.35 
 
Table 5:  Tobit estimation VI-XIV for the determinants of debt relief in sub-period 3 (2000-2004) 
  VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII  XIII  XIV 
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(2.23) 





































     
0.95 
(0.63) 
N  74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Adj.  R-squared  0.571 0.574 0.583 0.605 0.583 0.592 0.605 0.582 0.573 
Dependent variable is the amount of debt relief per GDP in sub-period 3 (2000-2004).    
Absolute z-values in parentheses.  
*  Significant at the 90 percent level. 
**  Significant at the 95 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level. 
                                                      
35   The coefficient for the CPI is positive but insignificant, too. The implementation of the CPI as the independent 
institutional variable basically produces the same results (with DR per GDP and POVERTY remaining highly 
significant) but affects the significance of the level of indebtedness (Debt per GDP). This could be due to the re-
duced sample size, because the CPI does not cover all of the 74 countries included in the other estimations. Because 
of consistency we do not present the results in Table 5. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Although we still identify some sort of path dependence, as the highly significant 
coefficients of DR per GDP in sub-period 2 imply36, the provision of debt relief in 
recent years seems to follow some prudential rules and to be conditioned on relatively 
decent policies rather than only the level of indebtedness and the amount of previous 
debt forgiveness. Two governance indicators (government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality) had a significant effect on the decision of creditor countries to forgive debt as 
well as on the decision about the amount of debt relief. 
Our findings mark an interesting and relevant policy result. Obviously, governments 
of donor countries seem to have learned and adjusted their forgiveness pattern to some 
extent. Debt relief at the beginning of the 21st century still followed some sort of path 
dependence. The quality of governance indicators was more important in the third 
sub-period. It seems that international donors do pay attention to the criteria of the 
HIPC and HIPC II initiative that refer explicitly to poverty reduction and – at least 
implicitly – take some institutional aspects into account. This result is promising and 
suggests that the discussion of institutions in development, which has its roots in 
academic circles and has been transferred into the international development organisa-
tions, has not only produced political statements but also some policy measures. A 
recent study by HECKELMAN/KNACK (2006) reaches similar conclusions with respect to 
official development aid. Whereas in the 1980s institutions did not play any role in the 
decisions to grant aid, in the 1990s this has changed. At the same time when interna-
tional donors started to link debt relief to institutional reforms, aid has been given – at 
least partially – depending on governance quality. 
Finally we analyze whether or not debt relief was granted to acknowledge successful 
efforts to improve governance structures in debtor countries. In order to do so, in 
addition to the total values of our governance indicators (H6a), we also tested if the 
change in governance quality influenced the pattern of debt relief at the beginning of 
the 21st century (H6b).  
Table 6 shows that four of the eight variables reach (at least weak) significance with the 
improvement in the rule of law being highly significant and most influential (estima-
tion XXII with the highest R²).  
                                                      
36   This variable measures the amount of debt relief relative to the GDP provided in both sub-periods. ANDREAS FREYTAG AND GERNOT PEHNELT D EBT RELIEF AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
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Table 6:  Tobit estimation XV-XXIII for the determinants of debt relief in sub-period 3 (2000-2004) 
 XV  XVI  XVII  XVIII  XIX  XX  XXI  XXII  XXIII 
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∆POLR 1-3   
1.22* 
(1.91) 
       
∆HERITAGE 2-3     
5.81** 
(1.89) 
      
∆GOVEFF  2-3     
4.54 
(1.51) 
     
∆CONTROLC  2-3     
5.51* 
(1.68) 
    
∆POLSTAB  2-3       
1.90 
(1.19) 
   








∆V O I C E   2 - 3           
2.14 
(0.89) 
N  74 74 72 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Adj.  R-squared  0.589 0.596 0.611 0.595 0.593 0.584 0.585 0.678 0.576 
Dependent variable is the amount of debt relief per GDP in sub-period 3 (2000-2004).    
∆s of the governance indicators are the relative changes of the average values of these indicators between the particular 
periods. Absolute z-values in parentheses.  
*  Significant at the 90 percent level. 
**  Significant at the 95 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level. 
 
These findings confirm that recent debt relief has been provided in favour of poor 
countries that have shown improvements in their governance quality, of course not 
neglecting the level of indebtedness and the amount of debt relief granted in the 1990s. 
It has to be noted that the significant institutional variables differ from those in Table 5. 
All in all these results are promising but the conclusions with respect to the learning 
effects in donor countries have to be careful and modest. However, looking at these 




Our findings confirm the acknowledged cognition that debt forgiveness did not have a 
great positive impact of economic development in highly indebted poor countries and 
even seem to have been detrimental to growth in the past, at least in some countries. 
One reason for this rather unsatisfactory result is the inappropriate allocation pattern 
of debt relief in the 1990s.  Analyzing the determinants of debt relief programs in the 
1990s, we derive a standard result of international political economy. Governments of 
creditor countries have granted debt relief rather because of political than of economic 
reasoning. “Political rationality” outreached “economical rationality” in the 1990s. In 
particular, we can confirm a path dependence with respect to debt relief granted. 
However, recent debt relief programs since 2000 seem to be positively influenced by 
economic and institutional development. This may be the case because of a successful 
learning process of donor countries’ governments and a slight change in the allocation 
pattern of debt relief along with the introduction of some sensible criteria during the 
last decade. Recent debt relief seems to be – at least partly – driven by the improve-
ment of governance structures in developing countries. Analyzing debt forgiveness 
within the framework of the Enhanced HIPC initiative, one can find a relation between 
grants and institutional quality. Institutional quality and good governance eventually 
are taken into account in the decision making processes of creditor countries and the 
International Financial Institutions right now. This is a very promising sign for those 
who still strive for development in highly indebted poor countries in the southern 
hemisphere. Before this result is taken for granted, however, more research is neces-
sary. It also has to be waited yet whether or not the G8’s Gleneagles Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI) is also driven by economic rationality. Although our findings 
give hope that this will be the case, the expectations of the impact of the MDRI should 
be kept modest. The effects will be long-term and probably difficult to measure.37 Our 
results strongly support the case of further conditionality in future debt relief pro-
grams. They show that it is sensible for debtor countries to reform their policy struc-
tures to obtain a debt relief. Donor countries should maintain this signal and reward 
sound policies and improvements of governance quality in debtor countries. 
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